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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, family enterprises constitute 95 per cent of the businesses,
and they represent more than 50 per cent of the gross national product. 1 In Argentina
more than 80 per cent of the business are family businesses. 2 A family business is
popularly defined as “any company where founders or descendants continue to hold
positions in top management, on the board, or among the company’s largest
stockholders”3 . Business Week magazine published a comprehensive article on
November 2003, highlighting the good performance of family business and showing
interesting figures 4 . The family businesses studied by BusinesWeek had higher annual
shareholder return, higher return on assets, and higher annual revenue growth and income
growth, compared with non- family companies 5 . The article listed a number of factors that
influenced the good performance of family businesses 6 . Those factors included: the
motivation provided by a legacy, the possibility to react faster than corporate
bureaucracies by taking quick decisions, the breeding of loyalty among employees, and

1

DONALD KELLEY, FAMILY BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (1990), §1.01.
ROBERTO D. BLOCH, LAS PEQUENAS Y MEDIANAS EMPRESAS. LA EXPERIENCIA EN
ITALIA Y EN LA ARGENTINA[SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZE BUSINESSES. THE EXPERIENCE IN
ITALY AND IN ARGENTINA] 42 (2002).
3
Family, Inc., Business Week, Nov. 3, 2003 at 100.
4
Id.
5
Id., at 102.
6
Id., at 104-110
2

1

higher levels of reinvestment in the company. 7 Despite the fact that the article focused on
big companies 8 , smaller family companies tend to share those advantages, too.
Although family businesses may be small, medium or big size companies, it is
true that most small and medium size businesses are family owned 9 . Small businesses
represent the biggest source of employment in USA and in Argentina. In the United
States, sma ll businesses employ more than half of the private-sector employees. 10 In
Argentina, businesses with less than 40 people employ 46 per cent of the private-sector
workforce. 11 Small businesses are mostly family businesses, so family businesses are
essential to the Economies of both countries. For all these reasons, the Law must provide
tools that help Family Businesses to optimize their performance.
Most small sized family businesses are part of what is known as “closely held”
businesses. Closely held firms combine: “(1) owner’s direct participation in management;
(2) restricted transferability of management rights; and (3) a lack of a public market for
the firm’s shares”12 . These characteristics together with the specific characteristics of
family business presented below, give rise to the different expectations and concerns of
the founders that this thesis explores in Part II.
Some entrepreneurs seek for advice about the choices of legal entity and they
begin their ventures with a legal organization from the start-up 13 . Others, wait until the

7

Id.
Id., at 111. The article focused on the 177 family companies found on the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock
index, as of July, 2003.
9
A. BAKR IBRAHIM & WILLIAM H. ELLIS, FAMILY BUSINESS MANAGEMENT. CONCEPTS
AND PRACTICE 3 (1994)
10
Clare Ansberry, Small Companies Slowly Build Momentum in the Job Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,
2003, at A1.
11
BLOCH, supra note 2 at 44.
12
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES §10.01 279 (2d ed. 2002).
13
Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for
Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 195, 208 (1997).
8
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net income of the business exceeds his or hers living expenses to give their business a
legal entity14 . “Every year a million new businesses are established. Perhaps one-third of
these are started with the help of a lawyer”15 .
Part III of this thesis studies the choices of legal entity available to family
businesses in Argentina and in USA. Argentine Law and American Law provide family
businesses with different choices of legal entity. In both countries entrepreneurs have
options of business’ legal entity with or without limited liability. For different reasons,
discussed below, limited liability is preferred for family businesses’ founders. This thesis
presents a comparative study of the different choices of legal entity with limited liability
for family businesses in Argentina and in the USA.
In Argentina, entrepreneurs may organize a SRL or “Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada”, or they may organize a SA, “Sociedad Anonima”16 . In the USA, more choices
are available. Founders of family small business may choose between a closely- held
Corporation, Limited Liability Company (LLC) or Limited Liability Partnership (LLP),
with their variations. This thesis centers the analysis on the LLC and corporation in USA,
and their analogo us SRL and SA, in Argentina.
The limited- liability choices for legal entity of family businesses in both countries
present different approaches regarding: Decision-Making, Business Management,
Conflict-Resolution and Business Succession Planning. This thesis presents and analyzes
those different approaches. As conclusion the analysis shows that there is not a “best”
choice of legal entity for family business in the USA or in Argentina. The different legal

14

ROBERT P. HESS, DESK BOOK FOR SETTING UP A CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION 5 (2d ed.
1985).
15
Jones, supra note 13, at 216.
16
Law No. 19550, April 3, 1972, B.O. April 10, 1984.
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choices available provide with “better” or “worse” options of legal entity according with
the founders’ expectations and concerns. However, legislation in the USA has recognized
the special characteristics of family businesses and allows more possibilities of
customization of the rules than Argentina’s law. This last issue constitutes an interesting
point for future legislative action in Argentina.

4

CHAPTER II
EXPECTATIONS AND CONCERNS OF THE FAMILY BUSINESS’
FOUNDER/ FOUNDERS
As said, this thesis focuses in non-publicly held businesses controlled by the
members of a family. Family businesses share all general characteristics of closely held
businesses: performance based on the efforts of the founder, limited marketability and
lack of formality in arrange ments between owner and key personnel, among others. 17
However, family businesses have also specific characteristics, which make their
management and growth distinguishable from those of other small and medium business.
A family business implies an overlap of a “family system” and a “business system”18 .
The two systems function following different principles. The “family system” operates on
emotion-based bonds, unconditional acceptance, tolerance towards mistakes, equality
rules, lifetime relationships and generational and birth order authority19 . On the other
hand, the “business system” operates on basis of objective rational-based bonds,
performance-based evaluations, recording of mistakes, competence and performance rule
and power and role authority20 . Those differences may provoke problems to arise. 21 Also,
normally there is no market for the ownership interests of these businesses. Generally,
these enterprises lack liquidity for the investments and they lack the kind of control of

17

KELLY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
Michael D. Allen, Motivating the Business Owner to Act, SG020 ALI-ABA, 793 (2001).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
18
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performance and management that markets provide for publicly held business. 22 At the
same time these characteristics provide a big strength, because “that common bond of
family gives that business the ability to plan for the long run, rather than trying to satisfy
the short terms needs of faceless investors 23 .
A. Expectations:
1. Limited Liability
In partnerships and in individual owner’s informal firms, the law provides for the
owner’s personal or “vicarious” liability towards contract creditors and tort creditors.
This rule enables businesspersons to take loss-avoidance measures, but it also imposes an
important risk to their personal patrimony24 . Finding a way to declare the business’
liability limited to the company’s assets becomes highly attractive for family businesses.
25

. With limited liability, the personal assets of the entrepreneur are protected from the

company’s debts and other obligations. 26 The limited liability enterprise becomes the
sole responsible for business liabilities such as damage claims. Liabilities may include
situations of employee negligence, creditor’s claims in excess of business’ assets and, in
the case of professionals, malpractice claims by clients or patients 27 . Members or
shareholders of family companies with limited liability are not responsible for such
liabilities, unless creditors are able to show that the business form was organized to set up
a sham to defraud creditors or unless they expressly accept such liability. 28 Only under

22

CHARLES R. O’KELLEY & ROBERT THOMPSON, CORPORATION AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS 381 (4th ed. 2003).
23
Edward F. Koren, Non-tax Considerations in Family Business Succession Planning, SH005 ALI -ABA 1,
13 (Aug. 2002).
24
RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 278.
25
Id.
26
HESS, supra note 14, at 13.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 12.
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extraordinary circumstances the law allows the application of “piercing the corporate
veil” and it brings back the vicarious liability of members or shareholders29 .
2. Decision- making control
The founders of the family businesses tend to develop a strong sense of identification
with the company30 . The company becomes their alter ego, a projection of themselves.

31

Most family businesses constitute the founders’ life work and they normally find it
difficult to imagine a life separate from the business 32 . Also, they may find their selfesteem tied to their position on the firms 33 . The founders feel that to be in charge of the
family business provides them with social significance and social recognition.

34

However, the business needs to be prepared for the unexpected. Extraordinary
situations, such as sudden disability or death of the founders themselves or other key
executives of the family firm are possible 35 . Even before the founder is ready for starting
the process of transferring control of the business, “contingency plans” are recommended
to take care of these situations.
3. Managerial control
Communication problems exist in most family businesses 36 . Personality traits of
founders and children strongly influence the business performance37 . Founders may
expect members of the younger generation to devote their lives to the “welfare of the

29

O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 22, at 501.
KELLEY, supra note 1, at §1.06
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Allen, supra note 18, at 801
34
Id.
35
Shel Horowitz, Succession Can Cause an Identity Crisis, Related Matters (UMAS AMHERST FAMILY
BUSINESS CENTER), at http://www.umass.edu/fambiz/succession_identity_crisis.htm (last visited Feb. 9,
2004).
36
KELLEY, supra note 1 at §1.07
37
Id.
30
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business”38 . Children may not be interested in the business or even if they are active in
the company’s management, they may face psychological restraints in challenging
founders’ decisions and actions. 39
Problems may arise also when the sustainability of the business calls for changes, for
example the need of new management styles, which may seem as a “menace” by the
founder40 . Family business owners expect to retain managerial control of the business for
as long as possible. But as it will be shown in the following section, transfer of
managerial control is one of the key aspects for a successful succession planning for the
family businesses.
B. Concerns
1. Succession planning
Although it is not a concern entrepreneurs face at the start-up stage, stud ies show
that almost 80 per cent of family businesses’ founders hope the business to continue into
the following generations 41 . That hope is shared by 70 per cent of the founders’ children
42

. However only 35 per cent of family businesses survive to the second generation and

less than 20 per cent survive to the third. 43 Family business owners may face at one
moment or another, the crucial decision of whether they should sell the business or retain
it for eventual transfer to family members. 44
Family businesses’ owners have the possibility to plan for their own succession.
Succession planning for the family business involves “the transfer by sale or gift of
38

Id.
Id.
40
Shel Horowitz, Sustaining the Family Business, Related Matters (UMASS AMHERST FAMILY
BUSINESS CENTER), Winter 2004, at http://www.umass.edu/fambiz (last visited Feb. 9, 2004)
41
Allen, supra note 18, at 798
42
Id.
43
KELLEY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
44
Koren, supra note 23, at 40.
39
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interests in such entity by one or more of its owners, during lifetime or upon death, to
satisfy objectives of the entity and/or the owners”45
Reality demonstrates that this planning is not generalized, as a scholar stated
“there is a natural instinct to avoid consideration of the consequences that flow from
death”46 . Objective studies showed that “only about a quarter of family businesses have a
management succession plan and less than 30% have a buy/sell agreement that ensued
family succession”47 .
In spite of that natural tendency to avoid the issue, every founder of a family
business should consider taking some steps in estate planning48 . Those steps would not
only help to minimize taxes (probably the principal concern of the businesspeople), but
also this planning would help to “insure the continuity of the business, minimize
expenses of administration, and facilitate transfer of the business ownership”49 .
Estate planning may merely involve transfer of the founder’s wealth, but family
business succession planning involves much more. As said, founders of family business
generally expect the business to pass to the next generation. But before that happens,
“transfer of control” of the business comes into place. In this process, the goals of the
founder have to be pared with the goals of the other family members 50 .
The instructor of a course of study on Continuing Legal Education developed by
the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association in July 2001

45

Id. at 402.
HESS, supra note 14, at 117.
47
Koren, supra note 23, at 7, citing studies by Coopers & Lybrand (1993) and Arthur Anderson/ Mass
Mutual (1997).
48
HESS, supra note 14, al 116
49
Id.
50
Koren, supra note 23, at 35.
46

9

recommended the transfer of control of the family business to be gradual51 . This would
involve that the founder: “(1) identify one or more successor candidates with a sustained
record of performance; (2) place candidates in positions of managerial control to test their
abilities;(3) provide the candidates specialized training in how to run the company; (4)
gradually delegate more and more day-to-day management authority to them while
retaining ultimate control; (5) subject big decisions to collaboration between the owner
and successor candidates; (6) appoint the most proven successor as President while the
owner continues as Chairman; and (7) finally, when the successor is prepared to take full
control and the owner is ready to retire, transfer full control to the successor”52 . The
reunion of competent advisors: attorney, accountant, insurance advisor, financial advisor,
business appraiser, is also recommended together with the involvement on the process of
the potential successors and the key employees who may be concerned with the
ownership transition53 .
It is also fundamental to highlight that the succession process of a family business
requires a realistic assessment of family conflicts and emotional issues and members’
willingness to accept change and to overcome conflicts between intra-family goals and
relationships combined with the needs of the business as a viable ongoing entity. 54
“Succession planning must integrate current tax, business and liquidity considerations
with family relationship issues to achieve an overall plan that is workable both for current
operational needs, as well as for the long range estate planning goals of the client and the

51

Allen, supra note 18, at 816
Id.
53
Koren, supra note 23, at 21-34.
54
Id., at 1-5.
52
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financial success of the business”55 . The succession plan has to articulate the rights and
duties of those successors who remain in the business and has to provide for a method of
exit for those heirs who are not willing to stay (for example a buy-out).

56

Provisions

regarding the rights of in- laws or the case of divorces should be considered too 57 .
2. Costs
Entrepreneurs want to create the business and operate it with “minimal
paperwork, expense and aggravation”58 . But tailoring the businesses’ own sets of
contractual terms necessarily involve expenses for legal drafting 59 . Lawyers have to take
into account the relation of such costs and the business’ economic movement. Legal
costs cannot exceed the entrepreneur’s benefit from this activity. 60
For reasons of costs many small emergent family businesses do not have explicit
contracts. The parties of family businesses may decide consciously or unconsciously to
rely on default rules and judicial intervention as conflict-resolution means 61 . Statutory
standard forms help small informal firms facing eventual conflicts by settling default
general principles, for example voting rules. 62 Also, statutory standard rules save the
costs of learning about the specific contracted terms of the business 63 . These standard
rules generate “network benefits, such as judicial precedents, customs and practices that

55

Koren, supra note 23, at 10.
Id., at 11.
57
Beck Law Offices, Legal Tips for Family Owned Businesses, 1 (2001), at
htpp://www.becklaw.net/Pages/articles/BU/BU_6.html (Last visited Feb. 18, 2004)
58
Bay Financial Newsletter, Why Entity Planning is important to you, 1 at
htpp://www.bfa.online.com/news019.html (Last visited Feb.18, 2004).
59
Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. Law. 1, 2 (Nov. 1995).
60
Id.
61
Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73 Wash.
U. L. Q. 369, 374 (Summer. 1995).
62
Id.
63
Id.
56
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help in interpreting the terms”64 of the business’ organization. This “network benefits”
are useful not only for the entrepreneurs themselves, but also for third parties which are
doing business with the particular small business65 . However, potential problems are real
in family businesses. If they may be anticipated and avoided, the costs of ex ante legal
work will always be well spent.

64
65

Id. at 378.
Id. at 377.
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CHAPTER III
CHOICES IN USA REGARDING ENTITIES WITH LIMITED LIABILITY
States’ statutes provide entrepreneurs with “standard forms” of business
organization, but firms can contract around many of the applicable statutory provisions66 .
Statutes allow firms to adopt the particular structures that entrepreneurs see as more
adequate to their expectations. Also, statues help to develop a body of interpretative
judicial opinions and lawyer’s customs, which help to fill gaps in the statute or in the
business’ contract. 67
A. Choice of state of incorporation or registration.
A firm whose business is located in one state may choose to organize under the
rules on another state; states normally enforce the rules of the other statues, under the
“Internal Affairs Doctrine”68 .
Some jurisdictions are preferred by businesses looking to incorporate because
their courts have developed judicial rules and precedents that give predictability to
eventual conflicts. 69 Delaware and Pennsylvania are listed as the most preferred states.
Not surprisingly those are the two states with the highest ratios of corporate franchise tax
revenue to total tax revenues. State official and private professionals are highly motivated
there to keep their states in those high “rakings”70 and they act accordingly updating the
state’s regulation for the benefit of the companies.

66

Ribstein, supra note 59, at 3.
Id.
68
Id.
69
O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 22, at 141.
70
Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race Between the States,
But Heading Where?, 45 Syracuse L. Rev. 1193, 1262 (1995).
67

13

However, to incorporate in a state different from the one where the business exists
brings increased costs 71 . The non-residence state charges fees and the residence state also
does so, even sometimes the residence-state charges penalties for foreign firms operating
in their territory72 . For these reasons, most family business start-ups lack incentives to file
for registration or incorporation in another state, specially given the fact that they can
contract around the default provisions of their own state of residence 73 .
B. Choices of legal entity.
Family closely held business benefit from the existence of jurisdictional
competition among the states, because that increases the legal choices available for
meeting their specific needs. In the same sense, each state provides a variety of business’
forms and structures.
There are different types of business organization that may be appropriate for
family held businesses. Legal and Tax advisors may help entrepreneurs to choose the
rules that better suit their particular businesses. For doing so, they should take into
account the applicable default rules, the possibility of tailoring legal rules to meet the
entrepreneur’s expectations and concerns and the implied costs.

74

The design of the

business’ legal entity should consider, not only the initial or actual needs of the business,
but also the possibility of expansion. As the founders have in mind building a legacy for
their descendents, the legal entity selected should allow the business to grow over time 75 .

71

Ribstein, supra note 61, at 398
Id.
73
Id., at 397.
74
Ribstein, supra note 59, at 3.
75
Brian Ziegler, Building an Organization, Iowa Business Network (Indian Hills Community College) at
htpp://www.iabusnet.org/templates/main/articleprint.cfm?ID=23 (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
72
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1. LLC (Limited Liability Company).
a)

Governance

structure

(customization

of

decision- making,

business-

management, conflict-resolution).
LLC structure gives investors much flexibility in tailoring the organization of
their businesses. This business type combines corporate-type limited liability with
partnership-type flexibility and tax advantages 76 . When they first appeared in the U.S.,
the LLCs were called by euphemisms such as: “the best of both worlds”77 and “the better
alternative”78 and “Lawyer’s Likely Choice”79 .
Currently all US states, with the exception of Massachusetts, allow the formation
of the LLC with only one person (or “member”) 80 .

There is not a maximum in the

number of members of the LLC, however it is recommended to maintain the number low
to allow good communication and consensus among members. 81
All 51 US jurisdictions have LLC statutes, but those statutes are not
homogeneous 82 . The states’ acts are patterned following language borrowed from both
corporate statutes and partnership statutes 83 . Because there is not total uniformity among
the states’ LLC statutes, and as a means to help to homogenize such rules, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Limited

76

O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 22, at 470.
Marybeth Bosko, Comment. The Best of Both Worlds: The Limited Liability Company, 54 Ohio St. L. J.
175 (1993).
78
Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A. Hechtman, The Better Alternative: The Limited Liability Company, 20
J. of Real Est. Tax’n 348 (1993).
79
Peter A. Karl III, Twenty Questions on Selection of a Legal Entity, 7 at
htpp://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1999/0899/features/F40899.HTM (Last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
80
Nolo.com- Law For all, LLC Basics, at htpp://www.bplan.com/c/print.cfm?i=80,1 (last visited Feb. 18,
2004).
81
Id.
82
O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 22, at 466
83
Id.
77
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Liability Company Act (ULLCA) 84 . This thesis includes the different provisions of the
ULLCA regarding the respective analyzed aspects of the LLC.
Despite of some differences among the different states’ legislation, there are
common characteristics of the LLCs. The entrepreneurs form the LLC by filing an
organizational document (normally named “articles of organization”) 85 . Also it is
normally drafted a document settling the rules for the day-to-day managing of the
business (“operating agreement”) 86 . Normally the rules require the name of the LLC to
include the denomination “LLC”, “LC” or “L.L.C.”, or similar 87 .
The LLC may have multiple classes of members with different rights and
preferences 88 . Assets may pass in and out an LLC relatively freely89 . For that reason
LLCs are easily convertible in another type of entity if desired 90 .
Of course, limited liability of the members for the business’ debts is the rule,
unless otherwise agreed 91 .
Most LLCs statutes provide as default rule for the firms to be managed by the
members92 . Also, default rules provide for equal rights for all members and decision by
majority93 . However, the articles of organization or the operating agreement may
establish a centralized management to be conducted by one or more members, or by non-

84

O’KELLEY & TOMPSON, supra note 22, at 52.
Jonathan Gworek and Jeffrey Steele, Organizing the emerging business, SUAEM MA-CLE 2-1 (Main
Handbook) (2001).
86
RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 348.
87
ULLCA §105.
88
Gworek and Steele, supra note 85, 2-1.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
ULLCA §303.
92
Gworek and Steele, supra note 85, 2-1.
93
ULLCA § 404(a).
85

16

member managers.

94

In those cases, only managers take managing decisions and only

they act as agents of the LLC 95 . Exceptions exist related to amendment of the articles of
incorporation, admission of new members, new contributions of members, dissolution of
the company, merger and disposal of all company’s assets

96

.

Most LLCs statutes provide for “fiduciary duties” of managers, specifically “duty
of care” and “duty of loyalty”97 . The “duty of care” is sometimes defined as “a duty to
avoid willful or reckless conduct” and in other cases as the duty to act “as a prudent
person in similar circumstances with a right to rely reasonably on reports of others”98 .
The “duty of loyalty” generally comprises the duty to avoid self-dealing and to avoid
usurpation of business’ opportunities 99 .
LLCs’ members make contributions to the firm’s capital. Such contributions may
include property, cash or obligations to perform services 100 . As said before, members
may be divided in different classes with different rights as to distributions and voting
rights 101 . Many statutes provide per-capita allocation among partners as default rule 102 .
Other statutes provide pro-rata allocation of financial rights according to the
contributions to the firm103 . However, members may contract around and relate their
financial rights to their contributions to the firm104 .

94

RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 364.
Id.
96
ULLCA § 404(b) and (c).
97
Ribstein, supra note 59, at 16. ULLCA §409.
98
Id.
99
Id.at 18.
100
RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 360. ULLCA §401.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id., at 363.
95
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Lack of liquidity is a general problem in LLCs, as it is in all closely held
businesses105 . Oppression of minority interest holders by majority interest holders is
another common problem106 . Contracting around these risks is highly recommended as a
means to avoid future conflicts 107 .
Distributions of profits are normally members’ decision108 . Distribution made
prior to the members’ withdrawal or dissolution is called “interim distribution”109 . Most
statutes provide for vicarious liability of the members in the case of distributions made to
them by an insolvent LLC 110 .
b) Business succession planning.
Default rules provide that LLC’s financial rights are freely transferable in the
absence of contrary agreement 111 . Under the same default rules management rights may
only be transferred with the consent of the other partners 112 .
Many LLCs address restrictions of ownership transfers in their operating
agreements, for example by giving the other members the right to buy-out the transferring
members before they sell their interests to third parties 113 .
Members may dissociate from the LLC because of voluntary withdrawal,
bankruptcy, expulsion, determination of incapability or, of course, death114 . Dissociated

105

Id.
Id.
107
Id. at 480.
108
ULLCA §405(a); §404 ( c ) (6).
109
RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 364.
110
Ribstein, supra note 59, at 12. ULLCA §406, §407.
111
Id., at 14. ULLCA §502.
112
Id. ULLCA §503.
113
Cohen & Co., All in the Family? Not Quite, at
htpp://www.business-survival.com/articles/startrun/AllinFamily.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
114
Ribstein, supra note 59, at 25. ULLCA §601.
106
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members usually have the right to be paid for the value of their interest115 . Successors- ininterest of a member dissociated by death, are not automatically included in the LLC as
members116 . Unless agreement in the contrary, the remaining members have a default
right to veto admission of a new member117 .
Regarding dissolution, most state statutes establish that members should decide
whether the LLC would continue its existence in the event of the death, resignation of
retirement of one or more of its members118 . The default rule is normally that LLCs lack
continuity of life as an intrinsic characteristic 119 .
c) Costs.
At the beginning of their existence, the IRS required the LLCs to have noncorporate governance characteristics to receive partnership- like tax benefits120 . Later,
federal law permitted non-corporate or pass-thought tax treatment to any non-publicly
held entity without regard to governance characteristics 121 . This measure allowed LLC
members “to make special allocations of income and loss and the ability to avoid taxation
at the entity level” 122 . After the IRS established in 1997 the “check the box” rule, and
allowed non-publicly held unincorporated firms to be taxed as partnerships, the use of the
LLC legal entity increased 123 .
A recognized scholar also suggested that “forming a partnership or LLC rather
than a corporation arguable reduces the firm’s exposures to antitrust, securities,
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employment discrimination, or other regulation”124 . Another author considers the LLC to
be a better choice of legal entity for small businesses because “you have lower level
ongoing legal costs, you don’t need shareholders or directors meetings, and there is only
a single layer of taxes when you sell the assets of the business. It’s worth the several
thousand dollars per year of extra payroll taxes it may cost”125 .
LLCs’ statutes provide parties with broad freedom of contract within the limits
settled by their mandatory provisions 126 . For this reason, to form the LLC may imply high
costs of legal drafting. Given that the LLCs default rules are very flexible, it is crucial for
members to state in the LLC’s “operating agreement” their rights, responsibilities,
percentage interest in the business, share of profits and ex ante solutions for situations as
the death or separation of a partner, or causes for dissolution, among others. In spite of
possible higher legal costs, contracting in LLCs is very important also because precedents
and default rules are not so well developed for this type of business entities as they are
developed for other types of businesses’ legal entity127 .
2. Closely Held Corporations.
To study the corporate form for family business we should also consider that
states’ corporation laws are competing sets of standard form rules. For that reason, this
thesis focuses on the corporate rules of the MBCA and the rules of Delaware. The MBCA
(Model Business Corporation Act) was developed and updated by American Bar
Association, Section of Business Law, Committee on Corporate Law128 . Delaware
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General Corporation Law (Delaware G.C.L) is a very comprehensive body of legislation
developed by Delaware’s legislature with the input from its highly specialized courts129 .
a) Governance

structure

(Customization

of

decision-making,

business-

management, conflict-resolution).
The corporate form presents many advantages for doing business. Corporate
shareholders are liable only to the amount of to their investments on the business
(unless they expressly agree different terms) 130 . Besides limited liability, corporations
continue its own living regardless of changes of ownership 131 . Other forms of
business form may terminate upon one of the partner’s death, corporations don’t.
Corporations allow easy transfers of ownership via transfers of stock and they give
flexibility for founder’s estate planning 132 . Also corporations are the most generalized
legal entity form for businesses that want to raise investment capital and potentially
become public in a future133 .
In spite of the possibility of contracting around in some cases, corporations posses
“continuity

of

life”

and

“free

transferability

of

interests”,

as

essential

characteristics134 . Corporations continue their existence regardless of the death,
retirement or resignation of one or more of their shareholders135 . Closely held
corporations are considered more flexible than LLCs in terms of exit strategy136 .
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Stockholders may exchange their stock for stock of an acquiring corporation, or they
can frame their exit as stock sale building the operation as capital gain 137 .
However, corporate default rules may be unsuited to family business, whose
owners may prefer simpler partnership-type governance rules with direct member
participation in management and lower costs 138 . Another factor not benefiting the use
of corporation form for small family business is that entrepreneurs in corporations are
subject to double taxation (at the firm level and at distribution level) 139 .
Corporations have as another essential characteristic “centralization of
management”140 . They are managed by or under the direction of the Board of
Directors141 . Board members determine basic corporate policies and also take
fundamental decisions, as the declaration of dividends142 . Directors’ power is
exercised collectively and by majority rule 143 . The Board appoints and monitors
corporate officers, who act as the corporation agents

144

. Shareholders elect the Board

of Directors. After the Board takes the action, shareholders approve decisions such as
fundamental changes in the corporation’s governing rules or structure, mergers, sale
of all assets and dissolution145 . Shareholders don’t have liability to the corporation
beyond the amount paid for the shares and they normally also lack the authority to
bind the corporation146 . Shareholders “vote, sell and sue”. They normally have one
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vote per share 147 and they are generally able to sell their shares. However, this basic
right is usually limited in closely held firms 148 .
States statutes allow shareholders in closely held corporations to restrict or
eliminate the directors’ discretion149 . MBCA allows shareholders to modify norms in
the articles of incorporation and in separate shareholders’ agreements150 . This norm
allows the elimination of the Board altogether with the transfer of a corporate power
to one or more shareholders 151 . MBCA also allows agreements which establish who
will be officers or directors. These agreements are normally valid for 10 years, unless
otherwise provided 152 . They have to be adopted by unanimity and noted on the shares
(but omission of this requirement does not invalidate agreement)153 . Delaware GCL
contains a chapter named “Close corporations, special provisions”154 . A business may
adopt this status if it is composed by not more of 30 people and if the business does
not make public offering155 . The agreement has to be taken by a majority of stock if it
restricts or interferes with the discretion of the Board of Directors, but the agreement
has to be taken by unanimity and inserted in the certificate of incorporation if it
involves the elimination of the Board 156 .
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b) Business succession planning (transfer of shares, special provisions for “family
corporations”)
Normally the death of disability of a shareholder does not affect the corporation,
which has “continuity of life”. A corporation normally can be dissolved only via a
Board’s resolution approved by majority of shareholder’s vote 157 .

As said,

shareholders can normally transfer their ownership rights, together with their
management rights 158 . However, if the subsisting shareholders do not get along with
the successors of the retiring shareholder, problems normally arise 159 . To avoid these
problems, closely held family corporations should consider “succession planning” 160 .
“Buy-sell” agreements provide for the obligation or option to buy or sell the
interest in the business at determined price, time and under certain terms 161 . They
tend to establish provisions at the outset, giving surviving shareholders the right to
buy-out the dead shareholder’s successors. This agreement may give these rights to
one party or to all 162 . There are different types of these agreements 163 . “Redemption”
means “entity purchase” of the interest164 . “Cross-purchase” agreements give the right
to buy to the other shareholders 165 . A hybrid combine the two models, for example
providing for entity purchase if the interest is not fully purchase by the other

157

RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 280. DEL. G.C.L. §275
HESS, supra note 14, at 21-22
159
Id.
160
Michael R. Flyer & Mary Ann Mancini, American Law Institute, Planning for Business Ownership and
Succession,SE77 ALI -ABA 399, 401 (June, 2001).
161
Roland P. Weiss, Buy-Sell Agreements, Related Matters 1 (UMAS AMHERST FAMILY BUSINESS
CENTER), at http://www.umass.edu/fambiz/buy_sell_agreements.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
162
Id., at 3.
163
Id., at 3.
164
Flyer & Mancini, supra note 160, at 421.
165
Id.
158

24

parties166 . “Buy-sell” agreements may be coordinated with “transfer restrictions”167 .
During the planning of these provisions, funding, price and tax considerations come
into place 168 . Regarding funding, normally the provision states a combination of
insurance, savings or installment purchases169 . The price is established by different
valuation formulas, the possibility of the owner not reviewing that price may bring
eventual problems 170 . A combination of these formulas with some type of insurance
to cover the repurchase of shares may be a good option, too 171 .
Another aspect that should be taken into account regarding succession is that
some successors, especially in the third of fourth generation situations, may not feel
emotional bonds to the company 172 . This persons face the problem of lack of
liquidity of their shares and, as they normally are not actively involved in the life of
the business, they may feel that the company reinvests on their profits in itself and it
does not provide them with “fair” dividends 173 . Some mechanisms may be needed to
increase the liquidity of the parts of these shareholders, one example could be the
business to provide them with loans as a means of access to family resources 174 .
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b) Costs
Corporations do not have pass-trough tax treatment from the IRS 175 . Corporations
are subject to entity taxation, that means that the corporation will be taxed at its
income level, and at the same time the dividends distributed to shareholders will be
taxed, too 176 . The same would happen at the time of liquidation “if the corporation
has accumulated or current earnings and profits”177 . Shareholders are not allowed to
deduct corporate losses against personal income 178 . All this increases the costs for
family business’ owners. The only exception to this rule is Subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code, specifically created for small business 179 . This option allows
family held corporations to avoid extra taxation, but imposes limitations, as such the
requirement that the corporation have only one class of shares, restriction on who
may be a shareholder and a maximum number of shareholders to thirty- five 180 .
Some of the preferred states for incorporation, especially Delaware, do not have
attractive tax structures for business 181 . However, those states posses other means to
avoid transaction costs (such as provisions which reduce the cost for merger and
acquisitions), which allow them to keep their levels of preference among
corporations’ start-ups 182 . The main concern regarding costs in the corporate form is
the operating costs of maintaining the structure itself. Corporations should hold
directors’ meetings, annual shareholders’ meetings and keep minutes of the decisions
reached in them; also corporations should maintain detailed financial records and tidy
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accountant and banking records 183 . These formalities are many times forgotten in
family corporations, and that disregard may bring severe consequences for the
shareholders, even reaching in the worst scenario to the application of the theory of
“Piercing the Corporate Veil” by a judicial court184 .
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CHAPTER IV
CHOICES IN ARGENTINA REGARDING ENTITIES WITH LIMITED
LIABILITY
A. Choices of legal entity.
Argentina posses a federal system, the Law 19550, 185 part of the Commercial
Code, which regulates commercial entities 186 . In Argentina there is not a specific
regulation for family enterprises; they may adopt any of the available legal entities for
commercial businesses 187 . At the same time, Argentina’s options for legal entity of
commercial business are organized as numerus clausus, this means that parties cannot
create new types of legal entity and they must comply with the requirements imposed
by law to each of the types 188 . One important issue to state is that Argentina’s Law
does not authorize the organization of business entities with less of two partners,
members or shareholders 189 . Single owner enterprises are necessarily sole
proprietorships under Argentina’s Law 190 . The compulsory plurality of parties shall
be maintained along all the life of the business entity191 . The reduction to the number
of parties to one causes dissolution of the business entity192 . However, the law gives
the remaining partner, member or shareholder three months to incorporate another
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party and avoid dissolution193 . During this period, the benefit of limited liability of
the firm is suspended 194 . The choices of legal entity with limited liability in Argentina
available for family businesses are two: the SRL (Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada), similar to the American LLC, and the SA (Sociedad Anonima), analogous
to the American Corporation. Partnerships cannot acquire limited liability status
under Argentina’s law 195 . The entrepreneurs organize the firm by means of a contract
or agreement (articles of organization) and an “estatuto” (bylaws) 196 . The parties have
some level of contractual freedom to agree on the set of rules that will preside their
relationship, but strong restrictions exist to that autonomy. This is particularly true for
limited liability business organizations. Argentina’s legal system is very concern with
the misuse of business legal entity as a means to commit fraud 197 . For that reason, the
theory of “piercing the corporate veil” is specifically stated in Law 19550198 . There
are also other aspects of Law involved in the life of family business, the regulation on
matrimonial property and wills and estates, are examples of other areas of Law
related to the life of family business 199 .
1. SRL (Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada).
a) Governance structure (possibilities of customization on decision- making,
business- management, conflict-resolution).
The SRL is a type of legal entity specially delineated for small businesses 200 . The
number of members must be at least 2 and must not exceed 50. Members are treated as
193
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partners for tax purposes 201 . As said, commercial business entities shall not have less than
two partners or members under Argentina’s Law. Since the 40s, there have been many
attempts by legal scholars to include the one member LLC in Law No. 19550202 .
However, all of them failed 203 . The maximum number is also a compulsory requirement,
if the number of members increases during the life of the business (because of the
incorporation of a founder’s heirs for example), the law provides mechanisms of coownership of quotas 204 or unification of legal status, 205 or transformation of entity type 206 .
Entrepreneurs may organize a SRL by celebrating a contract or “articles of
organization” and registering it at “Registro Publico de Comercio”207 at the government
agency in charge of business organizations (in Buenos Aires City, Inspeccion General de
Justicia, office of the Inspector General of Justice, hereinafter IGJ)208 . A notice of the
organization of the SRL has to be published at the official national register, the “Boletin
Oficial” 209 . The name of the business must include the denomination SRL on it 210 .
The capital of the SRL is divided in units named “quotas”211 . Each quota has
equal par value 212 . The quotas are freely transmissible unless contrary disposition on the
agreement 213 .
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The “Gerencia” (“management”) is in charge of the management and
representation of the SRL214 . One or more managers, members or non-members as
determined in the contract, manage the business affairs of the SRL for the time period
agreed by the members in the articles of organization215 . Managers have the same duties
as Directors of the ‘Sociedad Anonima”216 . They cannot compete directly with the SRL
unless they obtain express and unanimous authorization of the other members 217 .
The default decision- making process of distribution of profits, share transfers,
appointments of managers and amendments to the company’s contract or organizational
documents, requires a general consultation to all members and a written manifestation of
their will 218 . SRLs of a small size may adopt provisions around this default decisionmaking process 219 .
Meetings of members are required to approve the annual financial statements of
SRL with a capital of a substantial size, settled by law 220 . Members, also called “Quotaholders” may meet with the frequency stated in the SRL agreement 221 . Their approval
may be required with respect of the annual financial statements, distribution of profits,
quota transfers, changes in the appointment of a manager, and amendments to the SRL
agreement. 222 Each quota gives one vote 223 . The constitutive agreement of the SRL may
establish the majority required to its amendment 224 . This has to be at least one vote more
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than those that represent half of the social capital225 . In the absence of a specific
agreement the law requires two thirds of the social capital to amend the constitutive
agreement 226 . If one of the business’ members posses more than half of the capital, it is
required also the vote of another members to approve the decision227 . Decisions should be
registered in a book of minutes228 .
A syndic or surveillance committee is optional229 . If it is organized its duties are
the same such as the ones for this surveillance body for the SA230 .
The law gives the right of buy-out for the members who voted against an
amendment of the social object or an agreement that burdens their duties 231 . In the case of
an increase of the social capital, all members (even those who voted against the measure)
have the right to subscribe quotas proportional to their actual participation in the
business’ capital232 .
b) Business succession planning (possibilities of customization on transfers of
stock and incorporation of heirs).
In the case of death of one of the members, his heirs may be incorporated to the
SRL as members, if the SRL contract so provides. But before that, the legal proceeding of
the succession by inheritance determining the identity of the heirs of the decedent
member has to be completed. 233 . The death of a member does not produce the dissolution
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of the SRL, unless it reduces the number of members to one, in which case the
procedures explained supra apply. 234 .
The successors may transmit the quotas unless there are limitations in the
agreement 235 . In those cases, the surviving members have the right to acquire the quotas
at the same price agreed between the heirs and the offering third party236 .
The SRL contract may impose limitations on the transfer of quotas. The
agreement may limit the transferability of the quotas, buy it may not forbid it 237 .
Common limitations are to require the consent of the other quota holders or a majority of
them (“consent limitations”), or to set a right of preference in their favor (“preference
limitations”) 238 . In the case of a limitation of the transfer of quotas, the agreement must
determine the procedures for the non-transferring members approval or for the buy-out239 .
The maximum term for the other members to manifest their will of proceed with the buyout is 30 days 240 . This regulation tends to prevent that the remaining members try to keep
the heirs “captive” by postponing indefinitely the manifestation of their will to buy-out
the inherited quotas 241 . The Law No. 19550 provides a judicial appeal for the case of
conflict regarding the price or other matters related to the buy-out 242 .
c) Costs.
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The registering fee that IGJ charges are $100 (100 PESOS of Argentina) plus $30
(30 PESOS of Argentina) 243 . The “urgent” registration (on the same day) costs $282 (282
PESOS of Argentina)244 . Other costs are the publication in the “boletin oficial”
(approximately $350 PESOS of Argentina, related to the length of the text to be
published) and the professional fees of the lawyer and the “escribano” (notary). Lawyers
and notaries” charge between $200 and $500 PESOS of Argentina as professional fees.
Escribanos charge also around $350 PESOS for conducting process of registration. The
legalization of signatures and copies is around 50 PESOS. The total cost of constitution
of a SRL is between 1100 and 1700 PESOS of Argentina 245 .
The cost advantage of the SRL relates to the flexibility this type of legal entity
has. Lack of close government supervision of the operation of the business once it is
formally constituted and the lack of formalities for the calling of members meeting help
to maintain the operating costs of the SRL relatively low.
2. SA (Sociedad Anonima).
a) Governance structure

(not

customization

of

decision- making,

little

customization on business- management and conflict resolution).
The “Sociedad Anonima” (hereinafter SA) is the Argentine equivalent to the
American Corporation. Act 19.550, regulates the name, object, duration, capital, election
and governance of the SA246 . The minimum number of shareholders of a SA is two (as
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for all business legal entities), but there is no maximum number of shareholders247 . As a
matter off act, the SA was conceived as a means to provide legal entity to the big
enterprises, where the shareholders are mere “investors” and they are not involved in the
everyday management of the business248 . However, sociological reasons caused a
considerable amount of smaller close-type of business to adopt the SA as le gal entity249 .
For historical unjustified motives Argentina’s society considers the SA as a more
“prestigious” and “serious” form of legal entity for commercial endeavors250 . According
to the statistical data published by the IGJ, in Buenos Aires City in the year 2000, 4501
SRLs were created; and in the same period 7064 SAs were incorporated 251 . In 2001, IGJ
registered 3956 SRLs, and 5126 SAs 252 . And in the year 2002, IGJ registered 4244 SRLs
and 5306 SAs 253 .
Law No. 19550 somehow distinguishes publicly held SAs and closely held
SAs 254 , establishing broader requirements of government supervision for publicly held
SAs 255 . There are not specific regulations for closely held business, but there are some
specific regulations for publicly held businesses. This part does not include the specific
regulations for publicly held businesses, only the regulations common to all SAs, which
are the ones that apply to family businesses as closely held SAs.
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The organization and structure of the SA is very formal. The constitutive
agreement must be written in an “escritura publica”256 and it must contain the
denomination “Sociedad Anonima” or “SA”257 . This document has to be published at the
“Boletin Oficial”. Shareholders approve the “estatuto” (constitutive agreement) in an
inaugural meeting. In the same meeting they elect the “Directorio” (Board of Directors)
and they subscribe and pay the capital258 . They also elect a “sindicatura” (Corporate
Comptroller) and they may elect a “comite de vigilancia (Surveillance Committee). All
records are submitted to the IGJ for official registering 259 . Small businesses may avoid
organizing these two corporate governance bodies.
Shares with a determined par value represent the SA’s capital260 . There is a
minimum capital to constitute a SA, 25 per cent of the capital should be paid at the
moment of incorporation and the rest in two years261 . Limited liability to the acquired
shares is characteristic 262 . The “estatuto” may establish different classes of shares with
different rights, but all shares must have the same par value and all the shares belonging
to one class must have the same rights 263 . A share is a unit, not divisible 264 . In the case of
two or more owners, the rules of co-ownership apply265 . Dividends are to be paid once a
year and a shareholders’ meeting must approve their distribution266 .
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The Law provides for a required legal reserve of 20 per cent of the capital, formed
by setting aside 5 percent of the firm’s profits each year 267 .
The “asamblea” (shareholders’ meeting) expresses the social will of the SA, it is
considered “sovereign” because the Board must obey the decisions taken in it according
to the law and to the “estatuto”268 . The minority shareholders dissatisfied with a decision
taken in “asamblea” may look for its judicial nullity based on a violation of the law or of
the “estatuto”269 . The minority shareholders have an appraisal right for the case that the
majority approves a fundamental change in the conditions under which they joined the
SA270 . Because of that right this minority shareholders may demand the payment of their
shares according to the values stated in the last approved balance sheet271 .
There are two types of “asamblea”, “ordinary” or “extraordinary”. Their
difference consists in the substance of the decisions to be taken in them. The “asamblea
ordinaria” considers the approval of the accountancy results, distribution of dividends,
election and liability of directors, syndics and members of the surveillance committee,
increases of capital (if previously authorized in the “estatuto”272 ) and any other issue
related to the management of the business included in the notice 273 . The “asamblea
extaordinaria” decides the amendment of the “estatuto”, all other cases of capital
increase, capital reduction, repurchase of shares by the firm, merger, transformation and
dissolution of the SA, issuance of debentures and bonds, and suspension of the right of
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“preference” in the issuance of new shares 274 . These extraordinary assemblies may be
called at any moment that they are needed 275 . The Board or the “sindico” in the cases
provided at the law annually within four months after the financial year ended calls the
“asamblea ordinaria”276 . A group of shareholders representing at least 5 % of the capital
may require an “asamblea”, too 277 . The notice should be published in the “Boletin
Oficial” for 5 days with an anticipation of between 10 and 30 days previous to the
meeting’s date 278 .

As said, Argentina does not have special provisions for family

business. This brings serious problems for the family SAs. A clear example is the no tice
for shareholders’ meetings 279 . The law provides for such meetings to be noticed in a
publication at the “Boletin Oficial” 280 . This is a wise protection for the general public
interest in publicly held business, but family SAs do not normally publish the
convocation in the “Boletin Oficial”, their day-to-day life is spontaneous and the meeting
normally unanimous 281 . However, the cited provision has been used as a means to avoid
the presence in the shareholders’ meeting of some shareholders who do not take part of
the management 282 . By publishing the meeting at the “Boletin Oficial” the management
obeyed the law and “got rid” of the “annoying presence” of minority shareholders in the
meeting. 283 Shareholders may be present at the meeting or they may be represented by
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proxy, but the law does not allow the proxy to be given to a Director, manager or
syndic 284 .
The “Directorio” or Board of Directors manages the SA285 . Their term is
determined in the “estatuto” and it may not exceed three years or five years if the SA has
a “Comite de Vigilancia” (not common for family business) 286 . The default rule is the
maximum authorized term287 . Shareholders’ meeting elects the Board members and it can
reelect them for unlimited successive terms 288 . Normally the Directors are persons, but
the law authorizes a legal entity (business) to be Director of another legal entity289 . The
IGJ has authorized a SRL to be designated Director of a SA290 . The “estatuto” should
establish the organization and functioning of the Board, its quorum can by less than a
majority of Board members 291 . Election based on classes of shares 292 and cumulative
voting 293 are options authorized by the Law. The Board meets at least 3 times a year 294 ,
and the roles of the directors are personal and cannot be delegated 295 . The law accepts the
delegation of the vote of one director to another, but only in the case that the meeting has
quorum 296 . The meetings may not be held by mail 297 . This has been extended to the
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impossibility of using electronic media either298 . The President of the Board represents
the SA in all matters, but the “estatuto” may establish this representation to be shared by
two or more directors or by an “executive committee” of directors 299 . The Board elects
the firm’s officers (called “gerentes”) 300 . The remuneration of the directors is optional,
but the law states a maximum of 25% of the firm’s profits for the directors’
remuneration301 . SAs must maintain official books302 .
b) Business succession planning (possibilities of customization on transfers of
shares, not special provisio ns for “family corporations”).
Shares are freely transferable 303 . The “estatuto” may restrict such transferability,
but it may not prohibit it 304 . The death of a shareholder does not produce the dissolution
of the SA, nor does the dissociation of the deceased shareholder305 . The shareholder’s
successors acquire the role of new shareholders by force of the law 306 . However, the
“estatuto” may establish a limitation of the transferability of nominal shares, but it may
not prohibit such transferability307 . This may be done with the purpose of protect the
cohesiveness of the founder group, the conduction of the business or other purposes308 .
Those provisions are valid 309 and they should be written in the shares 310 . In those cases,
the “estatuto” must provide the procedure for the acquisition of the successors’ shares at a
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fair price 311 . In despite of the legal authorization of these type of agreements, reality
shows that members of family SAs do not tend to settle these provisions because they do
not want to “spoil” the enthusiasm of the new endeavor, and also because determining
how to establish the price of the shares for the buy-out involves technical difficulties 312 .
c) Costs.
The registering fee that IGJ charges for SA constitution is higher than the ones of
the SRL (220 PESOS of Argentina) 313 . The “urgent” registration (on the same day) is
also an extra 182 PESOS of Argentina 314 . Other costs are the publication in the “boletin
oficial” (approximately $300 or $400 PESOS of Argentina, related to the length of the
text to be published), and the professional fees of the lawyer and the “escribano” (notary).
Lawyers and notaries charge between $600 and $800 PESOS of Argentina as
professional fees. Escribanos charge also around $200 PESOS for conducting process of
registration. The legalization of signatures and copies is around 50 PESOS and other
official fees are 40 PESOS. Seals reach around 80 PESOS of Argentina. The total cost of
constitution of a SRL is between 1500 and 1900 PESOS of Argentina 315 .
SAs’ structure is complex, and their constitution and functioning is the most
expensive of that of all the other types of legal entity for businesses 316 .
SAs have requirements of publicity and they have constant supervision of
government administrative offices 317 . Argentina’s government has agencies at the
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national and local levels to oversee the existence and life of the SAs 318 . The government
supervision of the development and functioning of the SAs is very close. That implies
higher costs.
A. New developments of legal regulation of Small and Medium Businesses.
Because of their national economic significance, the small and medium businesses are
in the agenda of Argentina’s administrators and legislators 319 . However, their focus tend
to be too one-sided towards financial and tax aspects. The National Congress passed the
Law No. 24467 in March 1995 320 . This law was named the “Statute of the Small and
Medium Businesses”, but its goal was mainly to promote the growth and development of
small and medium size business by means of providing tools to facilitate their access to
finance. Law No. 25300 amended Law No. 24467 to include in the system the “Micro
businesses”321 . The definition of a micro, small or medium size business is made by the
enforcement authority and it relates to annual total sales in three sectors farming,
industrial, trade and services 322 . As said, the main goal of these statutes is to provide
access to financing. The law creates a national fund for the development of the micro,
small and medium business 323 . The statute also created a new type of business entity
called “Sociedad de Garantia Reciproca” (SGR) 324 . The SGR is a group of businesses,
which constitute a common fund to guarantee the credits acquired by the member
businesses in the financial system325 . The SGR is composed by two types of members,
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“socios participes” (participant members) and “socios protectors” (protective members).
The “socios participes” are the micro, small and medium businesses that obtain financial
support from the SGR326 . The “socios protectores” are bigger businesses that obtain tax
benefits, opportunities of investment, and development of clients and sellers by
participating in the SGR327 . The only goal of the SGR is to provide security to the debts
acquired by its members with third parties 328 .
It is too soon to evaluate the success of the SGR system. According to the statistical
data published by the IGJ, only one SGR was created in each of the years 1999, 2000,
2002, and four were created in 2001. The economic recession that Argentina lives, since
the fourth quarter of 1998, aggravated by the overwhelming financial and economic crisis
that the country lived at the end of 2001, is probably an undeniable cause for a very slow
development of any changes in the business environment 329 .
These statutes did not cover the structural problems of the family businesses’. But the
peculiarities and organizational needs of the family businesses have not been indifferent
to legal scholars. Besides the failed ideas of single person SRL commented supra, other
projects were generated. One of the most relevant and controversial was the proposal to
include in the Law No. 19550 a new sub-type of SA called “Sociedad Anonima
Simplificada”, following the French legislation330 . That project developed by a
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Commission in 1991, tend to help to the adaptation of the legal system to the
requirements of the market331 .
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS.
As said, the ability to maintain a harmonious relationship among the family
members participating in the firm is essential to the company’s well being332 . The
company operates more efficiently on a basis of consensus, however, consensus is not
always possible because divergences of interest may appear 333 . This may lead to an
“exploitation” of the minority by the majority, via privation of the minority’s part of
profits or income 334 . Private contractual arrangements are an important tool to satisfy
members or shareholders needs in closely held businesses, but ex-ante legislative
provision and ex-post judicial intervention are very important tools also 335 .
The limited- liability choices for legal entity of family businesses in Argentina and
in the U.S. present different approaches regarding: Decision-Making, Business
Management, Conflict-Resolution and Business Succession Planning. This thesis
presented and analyzed those different approaches.
In the U.S. after the appearance in the 1990s of the LLC, there was a thought that
close corporations would diminish in numbers. However, that did not happen. The
reasons include the existence of precedents regarding close corporations, which give
businesspeople predictability and certainty in the eventuality of a judicial claim, and also
the existence of clear default rules, which are not as clear for the newer LLCs336 . Courts
have generated precedents that recognize the different characteristics of closely- held
332

Heterington and Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Solution to the Remaining Close
Corporation Problem, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1-4 (1977).
333
Id.
334
Id.
335
Id.

45

businesses, and legislatures enacted legislation providing for specific status for this kind
of firms.
In Argentina, because the SAs were conceived as the structure for big businesses,
they lack personal elements, characteristic of the other types of business legal entities. SA
Law considers shareholders as mere investors. However, shareholders of family SAs are
much more than mere investors. They are siblings, mother, father and children among
themselves. In spite of the availability of the SRL, considered by legal scholars a more
technically adequate form of legal entity for small family held businesses, family SAs are
many times the preferred option for family business founders for sociological traditional
reasons. As said, family SAs do not have a special regulation in Argentina’s Law, but
they should have legal answers according to its needs.
The conclusion to make at this point is that there is not a “best” choice of legal
entity for Family Business in the USA and in Argentina. The different legal choices
provide with “better” or “worse” options of legal entity according with the entrepreneurs’
expectations and concerns. However, legislation in the USA has recognized the special
characteristics of family businesses and allows more possibilities of customization of the
rules than Argentina’s law. This last issue constitutes an interesting point for future
legislative action in Argentina.
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